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Abstract
We study how matchmakers use prices to sort heterogeneous participants into competing
matching markets and how equilibrium outcomes compare with monopoly in terms of
prices, matching market structure, and sorting efficiency under the assumption of comple-
mentarity in the match value function. The role of prices to facilitate sorting is compro-
mised by the need to survive price competition. We show that price competition leads to
a high-quality market that is insufficiently exclusive. As a result, the duopolistic outcome
can be less efficient in sorting than the monopoly outcome in terms of total match value
in spite of servicing more participants. (JEL: C7, D4)
1. Introduction
Since the seminal work on network competition by Katz and Shapiro (1985) (see
also Farrell and Saloner 1986; Fujita 1988), there has been a growing economic
literature on competing marketplaces. This literature reflects the importance of
network externalities in industries ranging from telecommunications to software
platforms and to credit cards. In these industries, a competing marketplace is a
network (platform) on which participants interact, and agents’ network choices
have external effects on each other’s welfare. In most of the earlier works of
the literature, the driving force is the “thick market” effect that a larger network
providesagreater chanceoffindinga tradingpartner. This positivesize effectfa-
vorsthedominanceofasinglemarketplace,andacentralquestioniswhetherand
when multiple marketplaces can coexist in equilibrium.1 Although size effects
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1. Recently, research in this literature has increasingly focused on two-sided marketplaces, where
participants are interested in matching with those on theotherside. Ellison andFudenberg(2003)and
Ellison, Fudenberg, and Mobius (2004) reexamine the coexistence of multiple networks by allowing
a negative size effect whereby agents prefer networks with fewer competitors; Caillaud and JullienDamiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 2
are important in network competition, in many industries network participants
also care about the identities of other participants in the same network. For ex-
ample, in markets such as job search, real estate, and dating — where networks
areintermediaries— participantsareheterogeneousandnetworksdiffernotonly
in relative size butalso in quality. In these markets, participants’network choices
can have external effects on each other’s welfare by changing the composition
and hence the quality of the network pool. This type of “sorting externality”
and its implications for price competition have been neglected in the literature
oncompetingmarketplaces,which focusesonthe size effectsand assumeseither
that agents are homogeneousor that agents’ choice of network is independentof
their type.2
Thispaperintroducesamodelofpricecompetitionamongmarketplacesinan
environment where agents have heterogeneous qualities and where the expected
quality of the pool of participants affects agents’ decision of which marketplace
tojoin. Inourmodel,amarketplaceisarandommatchingmarketor,morespecif-
ically, a meeting place where participants randomly match with each other. We
have in mind a job market or a dating market, where agents have private infor-
mation about their one-dimensional quality characteristics (type) and where the
match value function exhibits complementarity between types. Because type in-
formation is private, agents self-select into matching markets based on the prices
and their expectations of the quality of the pool in the matching market. Under
the assumption of complementarity, how agents sort into the matching markets
by type has implications to efficiency in terms of total match value. The random
matchingtechnologyweadoptimpliestheabsenceofanysizeeffect. Thisallows
ustoisolatetheimplicationsofthesortingexternalitythatweintroduceherefrom
the consequences of the much studied size effects. We stress that our analytical
framework applies equally well to one-sided intermediary markets, such as pri-
vate schools that compete with tuition charges and country clubs that compete
with membership fees. In these applications, instead of random pairwise match
formationineachmatchingmarket(suchasa schoolor aclub), we canallowany
form of interaction among the participants so long as the reduced form payoff
function exhibits complementarity between the individual type and the average
type. Hence this paper, by introducing price competition in an oligopoly model,
also contributes to the literature on locational choices where the peer effect plays
(2001, 2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003) analyze the “divide and conquer” strategy of subsidizing
oneside ofthe marketwhile recoveringthe lossfromtheotherside; andArmstrong (2006)studiesthe
implications on price competition of “multi-homing”, where participants on one side of the market
can use multiple networks.
2. Ambrus and Argenziano (2004) modify the framework of Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003) and
allow for heterogeneous preferences. Agents have the same quality but differ in terms of willingness
to pay for participating in a larger network. In their model, the equilibrium distribution of participant
types can be different across networks; however, the size effect remains the only externality.Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 3
a critical role (de Bartolome 1990; Epple and Romano 1998).3
In Section 2 we lay out the framework of duopoly price competition in a
matchingenvironment. Inourmodel,matchmakersuseprices(subscriptionfees)
toinduceagentstosortintodifferentmatchingmarkets. Weintroducetheconcept
of matching market structure, which describes how agents sort into two match-
ing markets given the two prices. We then provide a criterion for selecting a
uniquemarketstructureforanypriceprofile. Pricecompetitionin amatchingen-
vironmentwith friction differsfromthe standardBertrandmodelsbecauseprices
also play the role of sorting heterogeneous agent types into different matching
markets. Aside from the usual strategy of lowering price to steal rivals’ market
share, our selection criterion formalizes a pricing strategy called overtaking that
is unique to the sorting role of prices. Overtaking a rival is achieved by charging
a price just higher than the rival does and thus providing a market with a higher
quality (average agent type). When the price difference is small enough, the
rival’s matching market loses all its customers because quality difference domi-
nates.
Section 3 contains our main results. No pure-strategy equilibrium exists in
thesimultaneous-movepricinggamebecause,foranypriceprofile,atleastoneof
the matchmakers has an incentive to drive its rival out of the market by using the
overtaking strategy. We provide a sufficient condition for the two matchmakers
to coexist in the equilibrium of the sequential-move version of the pricing game.
This condition requiresthe type distribution to be sufficiently diffused so that the
firstmovercancreateanichemarketforthelowtypesinordertosurvivetheover-
takingstrategyofthesecondmover,whichinequilibriumservesthehighertypes.
With the assumption of uniform type distribution, we showthat — at the equilib-
rium outcome of the duopoly competition — the total market coverageis greater
than the optimal total coverageunder a monopolist that maximizes revenue from
two matching markets, because the first mover must lower its price to prevent
overtaking. However, the equilibrium outcome involves inefficient sorting com-
pared to the monopoly outcome, because competition results in an insufficiently
exclusive high-quality matching market. When the type distribution is tight, the
matching market structure is less efficient overall under competition than under
monopoly, as the loss from inefficient sorting outweighs the gain from greater
coverage. We conclude our analysis with a brief discussion of the robustness of
our main results when the type distribution is nonuniform, and when more than
two matching markets are created. Section 4 provides further remarks on the
existing literature and the implications of our results for regulatory policies in
3. As a model of a one-sided intermediated market, our paper is also related to the literature on
demand externalities and pricing (Karni and Levin 1994; Rayo 2002) and to the literature on clubs
(ColeandPrescott1997). Forexample, inRayo’smodelofamonopolistselling statusgoods,demand
externalities arise from a complementarity in buyers’ utility functions between the buyer’s type and
the average type of buyers who purchase the same status good.Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 4
intermediated markets. Proofs of all lemmas can be found in the Appendix.
2. A Duopoly Model of Competing Matchmakers
Consider a two-sided matching environment. Agents of the two sides have het-
erogeneous one-dimensional characteristics, called “types”. For simplicity, we
assumethat the two sides havethe same size and the sametype distribution func-
tion F, with a support [a,b] ⊆ R+ and a differentiable density function f.W e
assume that a > 0 and that b is finite; the following analysis carries through with
appropriate modifications if a = 0 or b = ∞, and all our results hold without
change.
Two matchmakers, unable to observe types of agents, use prices (entrance
fees) to create two matching markets.4 For each i = 1,2,l e tpi be the price
chargedby matchmakeri.G i v e np1 and p2, agentssimultaneouslychooseoneof
three options: participate in matchmaker 1’s matching market, participate in 2’s
market,ornotparticipate. Ineachmatchingmarket,agentsarerandomlypairwise
matched. Random matching means that the probability that a type x agent meets
an agent from the other side whose type is in some set equals the proportion of
matching market participants whose type belongs to that set. We assume that
matching markets are costless to organize and that each matchmaker’s objective
is to maximize the sum of entrance fees collected from participants.5
A match between a type x agent and a type y agent from the other side pro-
duces a value of xy to both of them. This match value function satisfies the stan-
dard complementarity condition (positive cross-partial derivatives), which im-
plies that, in a frictionless matching environment, the total match value is maxi-
mized by matching equal types of agents. Let mi, i = 1,2, be the expected type
(average quality) in the matching market created by matchmaker i; the qualities
m1 and m2 are endogenously determined in equilibrium by p1 and p2 a n db yt h e
participation choices of the agents. The utility of a type x agent from participat-
ing in matching market i is then xmi − pi. Unmatched agents get a payoff of 0
regardless of type.
4. Owing to the assumptions of symmetry and random pairwise meeting, in our model each partic-
ipant in a matching market is matched with probability 1. If the meeting technology is such that the
probability of forming a match is less than 1, then our model with subscription fees is equivalent to a
model of usage fees, where subscribers are charged after a match is delivered but before the type of
the match is revealed.
5. The same framework can be used to analyze the optimal pricing of a single matchmaker that
competes with a free-access matching market; see our earlier paper, Damiano and Li (2007).Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 5
2.1. Matching market structures
First we examine the Nash equilibria of the simultaneous-move game played by
the agents for given prices p1 and p2. For concreteness, we refer to each equi-
librium as a “matching market structure”. Since our model is symmetric with
respect to the two sides, we restrict our attention to symmetric Nash equilibria,
whereeachmatchingmarkethostsanequalnumberof participantswith identical
support from the two sides. For any c,c  ∈ [a,b] with c < c ,l e tμ(c,c ) be the
mean type on the interval [c,c ] and denote μ(c,c) = c.
Definition 1. Given prices p1 and p2, singular matching market structure Si,
i = 1,2,is asymmetricNash equilibriumofthesimultaneous-movegameplayed
by the agents, such that agents participate in matching market i only.
SingularmatchingmarketstructureSi ischaracterizedbyaparticipationthresh-
old ci for matching market i, determined by

ciμ(ci,b) = pi if pi ∈ [aμ(a,b),b2],
ci = a if pi ∈ [0,aμ(a,b)).
(1)
The average quality mi of matching market i is μ(ci,b), and the threshold par-
ticipation type is either a type ci, which is indifferent between participating in
matching market i and not participating (when pi ≥ aμ(a,b)), or the lowest type
a, which strictly prefers participation (when pi < aμ(a,b)). In both cases, all
typeshigherthanthethresholdtypestrictlyprefertoparticipateinmatchingmar-
ket i.
Definition 2. Given prices pi < pj with i  = j = 1,2, dual matching market
structure Dij is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game
played by the agents, such that agents participate in both matching markets.
DualmatchingmarketstructureDijischaracterizedbytwoparticipationthresh-
olds, ci and cj, with a ≤ ci < cj < b, such that: either ci and cj satisfy
ciμ(ci,cj) = pi and cj(μ(cj,b) − μ(ci,cj)) = pj − pi; (2)
or ci = a and cj satisfies
aμ(a,cj) > pi and cj(μ(cj,b) − μ(a,cj)) = pj − pi. (3)
In both of these cases, the average quality of matching market j is mj = μ(cj,b)
and the thresholdtype cj is indifferent between the two markets. In the first case,
the threshold type ci is indifferent between participating in matching market iDamiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 6
with the average quality mi = μ(ci,cj) and not participating at all; in the second
case, type ci is the lowest type a and it strictly prefers participating in matching
market i with mi = μ(a,cj).
The assumption of complementarity in the match value function implies that
participationdecisionscanbedescribedbythresholdsandthat,inanydualmatch-
ingmarketstructure,highertypesjointhemoreexpensivemarket. Asaresult,the
singular matching market structures and the dual structures — together with the
“null matching market structure”, where agents participate in neither matching
market — cover all possible equilibrium matching market structures.6
Wenowmakeanassumptionthatallowsustodetermine,foreach pi ∈ [0,b2],
a price range [Θ(pi),λ(pi)] for prices pj > pi such that (a) the dual matching
market structure Dij cannot be supported for any pj < Θ(pi) or pj >λ (pi) and
(b) there is a unique Dij for any pj ∈ [Θ(pi),λ(pi)]. The lower bound Θ(pi) is
given by
Θ(pi) =

pi +
√
pi(μ(
√
pi,b) −
√
pi) if pi ≥ a2,
pi + a(μ(a,b) − a) if pi < a2;
(4)
the upper bound λ(pi) is given by
λ(pi) =

pi + b(b − μ(ci,b)) if pi ≥ aμ(a,b),
pi + b(b − μ(a,b)) if pi < aμ(a,b),
(5)
where ci is uniquely determined by ciμ(ci,b) = pi in the first case of (5).
Assumption 1. The density function f is non increasing.
This assumption leads to the following result.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, a unique dual matching market structure Dij
exists if and only if pj ∈ [Θ(pi),λ(pi)].
Finally we makethe followingstandardassumptionofmonotonehazardrate.
Let Ρ(·) = (1 − F(·))/f(·) be the inverse hazard rate function. We assume that
Ρ (·) ≤ 0; this is equivalent to assuming that the right-tail distribution function
1−F(·) is log-concave,which implies that the conditional mean function μ(t,b)
satisfies ∂μ(t,b)/∂t ≤ 1 (An 1998). Hereafter,let μl andμr be the partial deriva-
tive of the conditional mean function with respect to the first and the second
argument, respectively.
6. If p1 = p2 then, for the participation threshold c that satisfies (1), any strategy profile such that
types above c join one of the two markets and m1 = m2 constitutes a Nash equilibrium. We assume
that thetwo matchmakers evenlysplit the typesabovec; the analysisisunaffected by thisassumption.Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 7
Assumption 2. The hazard rate function of F is non decreasing.
The uniform distribution and the exponential distribution are the two polar
cases that satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. The uniform distribution on [a,b] has
a constant density while the hazard rate is strictly increasing. The exponential
distribution on [a,∞) has a strictly decreasing density while the hazard rate is
constant.
2.2. Selection of matching market structures
Unlike in standard Bertrand price competition, in a matching environment the
participation decisions of agents are not completely determined by prices: What
an entrance fee buys for agents on one side of the matching market depends on
participation decisions by agents on the other side of the market. Nash equilib-
rium alone does not pin down the matching market structure. It is possible to
have multiple matching market structures for a given pair of prices. Indeed, from
equations (1) it follows that, for any p1, p2 ∈ [0,b2], either of the two singular
matching market structures S1 and S2 can be supported as equilibrium.
We adopt as our selection criterion the “stable set of equilibria” notion of
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Their notion is a strengthening of trembling hand
perfection in strategic-form games (Selten 1975) and is derived from robustness
considerations in perturbed games where agents are constrained to non optimal
participation decisions (trembles) with increasingly small probabilities. Loosely
speaking, in our model a collection of matching market structures constitutes
a stable set (in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens) if it is a minimal collection
withthepropertythateveryperturbedgamehasaNashequilibriumclosetosome
matching market structure in the collection. In the Appendix, we give a formal
definition of a stable collection of matching market structures and prove the fol-
lowing result.7
Lemma 2. Assume p1 < p2. The unique stable collection of matching market
structures is a singleton and contains: (i) S2 if p2 < Θ(p1); (ii) D12 if Θ(p1) <
p2 <λ (p1); and (iii) S1 if p2 >λ (p1).
Stability in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens yields a unique selection of
matching market structure, even though the concept is a set-based refinement —
because, in general, different equilibria are needed to provide robustness against
differentperturbedgames. Tounderstandthisstrongresult,letusconsidercase(i)
7. At the boundary between S2 and D12 (when p2 = Θ(p1)), the two matching market structures are
both stable; however, since they are outcome-equivalent, which one is selected is immaterial to our
analysis. A similar observation applies to the boundary between D12 and S1 (when p2 = λ(p1)).Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 8
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Figure 1. Stable matching market structures for p1 < p2
where p2 ∈ (p1,Θ(p1)). In this case, the price difference is too small to support
the dual matching market structure D12, and the unique selection is the high-
price singular market structure S2. The low-price singular structure S1 is not
robust. This is becauseanyperturbationin which high typesare overrepresented
in the high-price market would create a high quality there and, since the price
differenceis small, would further attract high types. As high types leave the low-
price market, its quality decreases. This induces further deviations that unravel
the low-price singular market structure.8 In contrast, the high-price structure S2
is robust. In any perturbation, the first types to deviate to the low-price market
are the lowtypes,whichdrivesup the quality differencebetweenthe two markets
and limits further deviations.
By a symmetric argument, a unique matching market structure is selected
when p1 > p2. Figure 1 depicts the selected matching market structure for the
caseinwhichtypesareuniformlydistributedon[a,b]. Thedashedlinerepresents
the borderbetween the region with high prices and full participation (c1 = a)a n d
the region with low prices and partial participation (c1 > a). We refer to case
(i) in Lemma 2 as matchmaker 2 “overtaking” matchmaker 1 and to case (iii)
8. A similar argument can bemade if we adaptthe conceptof most likely deviating type from Banks
and Sobel’s (1987) theory of refinement in extensive games. In the low-price singular structure S1,
the type that is most likely to deviate to the high-price market is the highest type b.W h e np2 < Θ(p1),
type b agents would indeed want to deviate if they expect a sufficiently high quality in the high-price
market.Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 9
as matchmaker 1 “undercutting” matchmaker 2. The strategy of overtaking is
unique to the sorting role of prices. Overtaking a rival is achieved by charging
an appropriately higher price than the rival does. This provides a higher quality
marketthatinducesadeviationfromtherival’smarketbythehighesttypes,which
triggersfurtherdeviationsbylowertypeagentsandeventuallydrivesouttherival.
The overtaking strategy plays on the differences in willingness to pay for quality
(averagematchtype)betweenthehighestandthelowesttypeagentsparticipating
in a market.
3. Duopolistic Sorting
In this section we analyze the equilibrium outcome under duopolistic competi-
tion. First we show that no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the simultaneous-
movepricing game. This result is established by showing that, by using the strat-
egy of overtaking, each matchmaker can earn a revenue strictly greater than its
competitor, which is impossible in a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3. There is nopure-strategyequilibriumin a simultaneous-movegame.
The nonexistenceofpure-strategyequilibria in the simultaneous-movegame
pointstoadifferencebetweencompetingmatchmakingandthestandardBertrand
price competition. As in Bertrand competition, payoff discontinuities exist in
competing matchmaking because the matching market structure switches from
one singular structure to the other when prices move from p1 just below p2 to p1
just above p2. Payoff discontinuities tend to homogenizeprices in the absence of
any asymmetry between the competitors. In Bertrand competition this leads to
marginalcostpricing,butthesameisnottrueincompetingmatchmakingbecause
prices also play the role of sorting. If one matchmaker charges zero price, then
the other matchmaker can charge a price in the region of dual market structure
and earn a strictly positive revenue by sorting out the types willing to pay more
for a higher match quality.
Ratherthanstudyingmixed-strategyequilibriainasimultaneous-movegame,
welookatpure-strategy(subgameperfect)equilibriainasequential-movegame.9
We are able to identify intuitive conditions for a dual matching market structure
to emerge in equilibrium as well as generate results about the sorting role of
9. Existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium can be established using the concept of payoff security
(Reny 1999). By charging a slightly higher price, each matchmaker can secure a payoff that is at
worst only marginally lower against small perturbations of its rival’s price. It follows that the mixed
extension of our simultaneous-move game is “payoff secure” and hence a mixed strategy equilibrium
in prices exists (see Reny 1999, Cor. 5.2).Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 10
prices and the implications for sorting efficiency of price competition. These
insights would not be easily obtained in a mixed-strategy equilibrium analysis
of the simultaneous-move game. Furthermore, although we do not claim that a
sequential pricing setup is necessarily more realistic than a simultaneous-move
setup, we believethe sequential setup is appropriatefor an environmentin which
thereisanaturalpriceleaderasaresultofunmodeledfactorssuchasincumbency
or historic precedent.
In what follows, we consider a game where first matchmaker 1 picks a price
p1, and then, after observing p1, matchmaker 2 chooses p2. Matchmaker 2 has
a clear advantage in this sequential-move game in that, for any price p1, match-
maker2canovertakematchmaker1withaslightlyhigherpriceandearnastrictly
greaterrevenuethanmatchmaker1. Further,itturnsoutthatwhen p1 isveryhigh,
it is optimal for matchmaker 2 to undercut matchmaker 1, whereas overtaking is
optimalforaverylowprice p1. Thebestresponsefunctionofmatchmaker2isnot
monotone or continuous;in fact, it is undefined for some values of p1. Hence, in
this game the prices are neitherstrategic substitutes norstrategic complements.10
3.1. Surviving overtaking
Becauseoftheovertakingstrategy,matchmaker2hasanadvantageinthesequential-
move game. We want to know whether this advantage is so overwhelming that
matchmaker 1 cannot survive as a first mover. A possible strategy for match-
maker1 to surviveovertakingis to choosea priceso low that matchmaker2finds
it more profitable to create a more exclusive matching market than to overtake
matchmaker 1 and drive it out of the competition. We say that the type distri-
bution is “sufficiently diffused” if μ(a,b) > 3a/2. Intuitively, when the type
distribution is sufficiently diffused, there is room for two matchmakersto coexist
because the lowest type’s willingness to pay for a higher quality match is low
relative to that of the highertype agents. When matchmaker1 posts a sufficiently
low price, overtaking effectively entails serving the entire market. The opportu-
nity cost of overtaking is high, since matchmaker 2 could charge a much higher
participation fee by focusing on a more exclusive matching market.
Proposition1. Ifthetypedistributionissufﬁcientlydiffused,thenthereexistsa
pure-strategyequilibrium with a dual matchingmarket structure in a sequential-
move game.
Proof. Fix any p1 < a2. First, notethat undercuttingis dominatedbyovertaking
for matchmaker 2. This is because, in both cases, matchmaker 2 will serve all
10. For a survey of recent developments in the literature on complementarities and the applications
to oligopoly pricing, see Vives (2005).Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 11
types and overtaking generates a greater revenue with a higher price. It remains
to show that, for p1 sufficiently small, it is not optimal for matchmaker 2 to drive
matchmaker 1 out of the market by overtaking. By equation (1), the singular
matchingmarketstructureS2 obtainsforany p2 ∈ (p1,Θ(p1)]. Thethresholdtype
ofparticipationisc2 = abecause p1 < a2 impliesΘ(p1) < aμ(a,b). Matchmaker
2’s revenue from overtaking is simply p2 for any p2 ∈ (p1,Θ(p1)], so the best
overtakingprice is Θ(p1).F o ra n yp2 ∈ (Θ(p1),λ(p1)), the dual matching market
structure D12 obtains. By equation (3), c1 = a and c2 satisfies c2(μ(c2,b) −
μ(a,c2)) = p2− p1. Consider how matchmaker 2’s revenuein the dual matching
market structure D12,g i v e nb yp2(1 − F(c2)), changes at p2 = Θ(p1).S i n c e
c2 = a at p2 = Θ(p1), the derivative of matchmaker 2’s revenue with respect to
p2 at Θ(p1) is positive if and only if
μ(a,b) − a + a

f(a)(μ(a,b) − a) −
1
2

> f(a)Θ(p1). (6)
As p1 approaches 0, Θ(p1) approaches a(μ(a,b) − a). Thus, the derivative is
positive at p2 = Θ(p1) for p1 approaching 0 if and only if μ(a,b) > 3a/2. 
A sufficiently diffused distribution allows the first mover to survive the over-
taking strategy of the second mover by focusing on a lower quality “niche” mar-
ket. Note thatthe survivalstrategyofcharging p1 < a2 forthe first moverimplies
thatalllowtypesareservedandthat,witharelaxedparticipationconstraint,some
rents are left to the lowest type a. Also, the sufficient condition of Proposition
1 depends on the type distribution only through the unconditional mean μ(a,b).
Thisisbecause,attheboundarybetweenS2 andD12,thebehaviorofmatchmaker
2’s revenue is independent of the type distribution and is locally identical to that
under the uniform type distribution.
3.2. Low-price niche market
By considering the second mover’s incentives to overtake the first mover when
the latter charges a sufficientlylow price, Proposition1 providesa sufficient con-
dition for the two matchmakers to coexist in an equilibrium. The analysis leaves
open the possibility that, in equilibrium, both matchmakers have positive mar-
ket shares and the first mover charges a higher price. We now investigate this
possibility.
We will need a result about the revenue function of a one-price monopolist,
(1 − F(c))p,w h e r ec is determined by p via equation (1). In the Appendix we
prove that the revenue function is quasi-concave in price p (Lemma A.1). Let ˆ p
bethesolutionto theone-pricemonopolist’srevenuemaximizationproblem. We
have the following result.Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 12
Lemma 4. Under the uniformtype distribution, for any p1 suchthat Θ(p1) > ˆ p,
any best response p2 of matchmaker 2 leaves zero revenue to matchmaker 1.
Clearly, theoptimalresponseofmatchmaker2is ˆ pifit is afeasibleundercut-
ting or overtaking price (which occurs when p1 ∈ (λ(ˆ p),b2] or p1 ∈ (Θ−1(ˆ p), ˆ p)
respectively). This leaves zero revenue to matchmaker 1. When p1 ∈ [ˆ p,λ(ˆ p)],
themaximumone-pricemonopolistrevenueis not feasible. However,since p1 >
ˆ p > Θ−1(ˆ p), overtaking matchmaker1 dominates serving the higher quality mar-
ketin a dual structureD12. To seethis, observethat anyprice p2 ∈ (Θ(p1),λ(p1))
supporting D12 leads to a duopolist’s revenue, which is lower than the one-price
monopolist’s revenue at the same price p2 because the latter has a greater mar-
ket share. Since Θ(p1) > ˆ p, the quasi-concavity of the revenue function of the
one-price monopolist implies that this is, in turn, lower than the overtaking rev-
enue reached by charging Θ(p1). The proof of Lemma 4 uses the assumption of
uniform type distribution to rule out serving the lower quality market in a dual
structure D21 by showingthat this is dominatedby either overtakingor undercut-
ting.11 In either case, matchmaker 1 gets zero revenue. The next result follows
immediately from Lemma 4.
Proposition 2. Under the uniform type distribution, in any equilibrium with a
dualmatchingmarketstructure,theﬁrstmoverservesthelowerqualitymatching
market.
Proof. By Lemma 4, under the uniform type distribution we must have p1 ≤
Θ−1(ˆ p) in any equilibrium with a dual matching market structure. We claim
that matchmaker 2’s best response p2 belongs to the interval [Θ(p1),λ(p1)).T h e
proposition then immediately follows this claim, because either there is no equi-
librium with a dual market structure if p2 = Θ(p1) or else D12 is the equilibrium
market structure. To establish the claim, note that charging p2 ∈ [λ(p1),b2]
cannot be optimal because matchmaker 2 would have zero revenue. If instead
matchmaker 2 chooses p2 ∈ [0,Θ(p1)), there are at most three possible scenar-
ios. When the price pair (p1, p2) falls in the S1 region, matchmaker 2 has no
revenue. When the (p1, p2) falls in the S2 region, matchmaker 2 is a monopolist.
However,atprice p2 = Θ(p1), matchmaker2isalsoamonopolistbuthasahigher
revenue because Θ(p1) ≤ ˆ p and because the revenue function of the monopolist
is quasi-concave. Finally, when (p1, p2) falls in the D21 region, matchmaker 2’s
revenueis lower than the revenueof a one-pricemonopolist at the same price p2,
which is lower than the revenue generated by charging p2 = Θ(p1) owing to the
11. In the rangeof p1 for which there exists an overtaking price p2 that yields a greater revenue than
undercutting, matchmaker 2’s best response does not exist. This is immaterial to our equilibrium
construction and to all the results.Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 13
quasi-concavity. 
Proposition 2 shows that, when matchmaker 1 chooses a low price p1 such
that Θ(p1) ≤ ˆ p, matchmaker 2’s best response is either charging the maximum
overtakingpriceΘ(p1)orservingthehigherqualitymarketinadualstructureD12.
Notethatthisresultholdsregardlessofthetypedistribution. Lemma4(andhence
the conclusion of Proposition 2) does depend on the assumption of the uniform
type distribution, but the intuition is more general. By charging a very low price
oraveryhighprice, thefirst movertargetsanichemarketoffewtypesandmakes
the overtaking strategy unappealing to the second mover. However, while a high
price might invite undercutting, a low price is less vulnerable. Indeed, under the
uniform type distribution, if the first mover charges a price high enough to deter
overtakingthen the second mover will find it optimal to undercut. Thus, in order
to deter undercutting as well as overtaking, matchmaker 1 must find its niche
market with low prices. See Section 3.6 for further discussion on the robustness
of this result.
3.3. Market coverage
To study the effects on competition, we compare our duopoly model with a two-
price monopoly matchmaker. This is a natural comparison because the number
of potential matching markets is two in both cases. The monopolist’s problem
can be stated as choosing two participation thresholds, c1 and c2 with c1 ≤ c2,t o
maximize total revenue:12
(1 − F(c1))c1μ(c1,c2) + (1 − F(c2))c2(μ(c2,b) − μ(c1,c2)). (7)
Here we considerhowcompetitionaffects the total matchingmarket coverage—
that is, the lower participation threshold.
Proposition 3. In any equilibrium with the dual structure D12,t h em a r k e t
coverage is at least as large as in the optimal structure of a monopolist if
matchmaker 2’s revenue is quasi-concave in c2 for any p1.
Proof. Rewrite the revenue of the monopolist (equation (7)) as
((1− F(c1))c1 − (1 − F(c2))c2)μ(c1,c2) + (1 − F(c2))c2μ(c2,b). (8)
12. The proof of Lemma 6 in the Appendix shows that the monopolist will always choose prices
such that a dual matching market structure obtains. Thus, applying the selection criterion introduced
in Section 2, we can use participation thresholds (rather than prices) as choice variables for the mo-
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Since the first term in this expression can be made arbitrarily small with c1 just
below c2, the optimal thresholds ˆ c1 and ˆ c2 satisfy
(1 − F(ˆ c1))ˆ c1 ≥ (1 − F(ˆ c2))ˆ c2. (9)
Differentiating (8) with respect to c1 and assuming an interior ˆ c1,w efi n dt h a t
1 − F(ˆ c2)
F(ˆ c2) − F(ˆ c1)
(ˆ c2 − ˆ c1) =
Ρ(ˆ c1)μ(ˆ c1,ˆ c2) − ˆ c2
1
μ(ˆ c1,ˆ c2) − ˆ c1
.
If Ρ(ˆ c1) > ˆ c1, then the right-hand-sideof this equality is greaterthan ˆ c1, resulting
in an inequality that contradicts (9). Thus, Ρ(ˆ c1) ≤ ˆ c1.
For duopolistic coverage, matchmaker 2 chooses c2 to maximize its revenue,
(1 − F(c2))(p1 + c2(μ(c2,b) − μ(c1,c2))), (10)
subject to 
c1μ(c1,c2) = p1 if c1 > a,
aμ(a,c2) ≥ p1 if c1 = a.
(11)
It suffices to consider the case where c1 is greater than a and is determined by
(11) at some equilibrium price p1 = ˜ p1. Taking derivatives of (11) yields
dc1
dc2
= −
c1μr(c1,c2)
μ(c1,c2) + c1μl(c1,c2)
. (12)
Since matchmaker 2’s revenue function is quasi-concave in c2, a necessary con-
dition for equilibrium is that matchmaker 2’s revenue increases with c2 at the
boundary between S2 and D12 where c2 = c1 and p2 = Θ(˜ p1). At this point,
equation (12) becomes dc1/dc2 = −1/3 because μl = μr = 1/2 at the bound-
ary; by taking derivativesof (10) we find that this necessary condition is satisfied
if and only if at some equilibrium lower threshold ˜ c1 > a,
Ρ(˜ c1)

μ(˜ c1,b) −
4
3
˜ c1

> ˜ c2
1. (13)
Since μl(c,b) ≤ 1 by Assumption 2, for any c we have
μ(c,b) − c ≤ Ρ(c). (14)
Therefore, condition (13) can be satisfied only if Ρ(˜ c1) > ˜ c1. The proposition
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Without the assumption of quasi-concavity, condition (13) is generally not
necessary for an equilibrium dual market structure. This is because matchmaker
2’s revenue may decrease with c2 at the boundary between S2 and D12 and yet
there is a price p2 in the D12 region that dominates any overtaking price. In the
Appendixweshowthat,underuniformtypedistribution,matchmaker2’srevenue
is globally concave in c2 for any p1 in the D12 region (Lemma A.2). Moreover,
byProposition2it followsthat, underthesameassumption,anyequilibriumdual
market structure is D12 . Thus we have the following result.
Corollary 1. If the type distribution is uniform then, in any equilibrium with
a dual matching market structure, the market coverage is at least as large as in
the optimal structure of a monopolist.
The intuition behind this result is more general than implied by the uniform
type distribution. Competition expands the total market coverage because of the
first mover’s need to survive price competition. Only by lowering its price suffi-
ciently and catering to a low quality matching market can the first mover prevent
overtaking.
3.4. Market differentiation
Wenowaskhowtheequilibriummarketdifferentiation,intermsofhowexclusive
the high quality matching market is, compares with the optimal market differen-
tiation that maximizes total revenue for the two-price monopolist.
Definition 3. A dual matching market structure with participation thresholds
c1 < c2 has a greater conditional market differentiation than another dual struc-
ture with thresholds c 
1 < c 
2 if c1 = c 
1 and c2 > c 
2.
Definition 3 limits our comparison of matching market structures to those
with thesamemarketcoverage. We dropthe qualifier“conditional”whenthereis
norisk ofconfusion. Market differentiationheredoesnotrefertothecomparison
in terms of the quality difference m2 − m1 between the two markets. Instead, it
describes how exclusive the high quality matching market is: a dual matching
market structure has a greater differentiation if c2(m2 −m1) is greater — in other
words, if the participant with type equal to the higher threshold c2 is willing to
pay more for the quality difference between the two matching markets. Under
Assumption 1, the quality differencem2−m1 is non decreasingin c2 for fixed c1,
so this interpretation of exclusivity coincides with Definition 3. Note that market
differentiationintermsofexclusivityiswhatmatterstorevenuemaximizationfor
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matching market. We have the following comparison result.
Proposition 4. In anyequilibriumwith thedualstructureD12, the equilibrium
outcomehaslessmarketdifferentiationthantheoptimalstructureofamonopolist.
Proof. Themonopolist’sdifferentiationproblemistochoosec2 tomaximize(7),
takingas givenc1 and subject to the constraint (11). The first order condition can
be written as
μ(ˆ c2,b) − μ(c1,ˆ c2)
ˆ c2 − μ(c1,ˆ c2)
=
1 − F(c1)
Ρ(ˆ c2)
ˆ c2 − c1
F(ˆ c2) − F(c1)
. (15)
The right-hand side of (15) approaches 1 while the left-hand side becomes ar-
bitrarily large when ˆ c2 takes on the value of c1, and the opposite happens when
ˆ c2 approaches b. Thus, for any c1, there exists at least one ˆ c2 that satisfies (15).
Furthermore, the right-hand side is increasing in ˆ c2 because Assumption 1 im-
plies that (ˆ c2 − c1)/(F(ˆ c2) − F(c1)) increases with ˆ c2,a n dΡ(ˆ c2) decreases with
ˆ c2 by Assumption 2. The left-hand side decreases in ˆ c2 because μl(ˆ c2,b) ≤ 1 by
Assumption 2. Thus, a unique ˆ c2 satisfies (15).
For duopolistic differentiation, matchmaker 2 chooses c2 to maximize (10),
taking as given p1, and subject to (11). The first order necessary condition can
be written as
(μ(˜ c2,b) − μ(c1,˜ c2))
(˜ c2 − μ(c1,˜ c2))/Ρ(˜ c2)
=
˜ c2(1 − F(c1))
F(˜ c2) − F(c1)

1 +
μ(c1,˜ c2) − c1
˜ c2 − μ(c1,˜ c2)
dc1
dc2

+
c1μ(c1,˜ c2)
˜ c2 − μ(c1,˜ c2)
,
where dc1/dc2 i sg i v e nb y( 1 2 ) . B yA s s u m p t i o n1 ,w eh a v eμ(c1,˜ c2) − c1 ≤
˜ c2 − μ(c1,˜ c2). Moreover, μr(c1,c2) ≤ 1/2 ≤ μl(c1,c2). Thus, the first order
condition implies
(μ(˜ c2,b) − μ(c1,˜ c2))
(˜ c2 − μ(c1,˜ c2))/Ρ(˜ c2)
>
˜ c2(1 − F(c1))
F(˜ c2) − F(c1)
−
1 − F(c2)
F(˜ c2) − F(c1)
˜ c2c1
2μ(c1,˜ c2) + c1
.
(16)
Comparing (16) and (15), we find that ˜ c2 < ˆ c2 for any c1 if
(2μ(c1,˜ c2) + c1)(1− F(c1)) − (1 − F(˜ c2))˜ c2 ≥ 0.
Observe that this inequality holds at ˜ c2 = c1. Further, the derivative of the left-
hand side with respect to ˜ c2 has the same sign as
2(1− F(c1))
˜ c2 − μ(c1,˜ c2)
F(˜ c2) − F(c1)
+ ˜ c2 − Ρ(˜ c2).Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 17
This expression is strictly positive as ˜ c2 approaches c1 from above, and it is
strictly increasing in ˜ c2 because (˜ c2 − μ(c1,˜ c2)/(F(˜ c2) − F(c1)) is weakly in-
creasingin ˜ c2 by Assumption 1 while Ρ(˜ c2) is weakly decreasingby Assumption
2. 
Definition 3 requires us to compare monopolistic and duopolistic differenti-
ation for fixed market coverage. The proof of Proposition 4 establishes that, for
any equilibrium coverage, at the optimal choice of differentiation ˜ c2 of match-
maker 2, the monopolist’s revenue is strictly increasing in c2. Since it uses only
the first ordernecessarycondition,the proof doesnot requirethe assumptionthat
matchmaker 2’s revenue is quasi-concave. Under uniform type distribution we
can strengthen the proposition as follows.
Corollary 2. If the type distribution is uniform then, in any equilibrium with
the dual matching market structure, the equilibrium outcome has less market
differentiation than the optimal structure of a monopolist.
Intuitively, when choosing its own price, matchmaker 2 does not internalize
the cannibalization of the lower market. Rewrite the monopolist’s revenue func-
tion (7) as
(F(c2) − F(c1))p1 + (1 − F(c2))(p1 + c2(μ(c2,b) − μ(c1,c2))), (17)
and compare it with matchmaker 2’s objective function (10). According to (11),
c1 either stays constant at a or increases as c2 decreases, so the first term that
appears in (17) but is absent from (10) means that duopolist matchmaker 2 has
a greater incentive to lower c2 than does a monopolist.13 Such incentive exists
regardless of the type distribution. The uniform distribution assumption is used
to ensurethat the equilibrium matching market structure is D12 by way of Propo-
sition 2.
3.5. Welfare comparison
Tocompletethecomparisonbetweenduopolisticmatchmakingandmonopolistic
matchmaking, we now examine welfare in terms of the total match value, which
is given by
(F(c2) − F(c1))μ2(c1,c2) + (1 − F(c2))μ2(c2,b) (18)
13. The proof of Proposition 4 is complicated by the fact that the constraint (11) has different impli-
cations for the monopolist and the duopolist matchmaker 2: the former chooses c2 for fixed c1 with
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for any pair of participation thresholds c1 and c2 with c1 ≤ c2. A useful bench-
mark for the comparison is the two-market planner’s problem: choosing the effi-
cientthresholdsc∗
1 andc∗
2, with c∗
1 ≤ c∗
2,to maximizethetotalmatchvalue(18).14
We first compare optimal coverage ˆ c1 and efficient coverage c∗
1.
Lemma 5. Monopolistic market coverage is at most the efﬁcient coverage.
This result that the monopolist’s matching markets are smaller and more se-
lective than the planner’s does not require the assumption of uniform type dis-
tribution. In particular, following the standard price discrimination literature, we
can define “virtual type” of x as x − Ρ(x). As shown in Proposition 3. the mo-
nopolistwill neverserveagentsofnegativevirtualtypes, andthis establishesthat
the optimal coverage ˆ c1 satisfies ˆ c1 ≥ Ρ(ˆ c1). In contrast, the planner will service
additional low types so long as the benefit from the expansionof the market cov-
erage is not outweighed by the loss due to the reduction in the average quality
of the lower matching market. The proof of Lemma 5 shows instead c∗
1 < Ρ(c∗
1)
wheneverc∗
1 > a, implying that ˆ c1 ≤ c∗
1 by Assumption 2. Next, we compare the
optimal market differentiation ˆ c2 for the two-price monopolist with the efficient
differentiation c∗
1 for the two-market planner under any total coverage c1.
Lemma 6. Monopolistic differentiation is efﬁcient if the type distribution is
uniform.
For both the planner and the monopolist, increasing c2 raises the quality in
both matching markets at the expense of reducing the relative size of the higher
quality market. The effect on the objective functions is generally different, be-
causethemonopolistisconcernedwiththechangeinthemarginaltype’swilling-
ness to pay whereas the planner cares about the change in the average expected
type. Lemma 6 shows that the effect is the same for type distributions, including
uniform and exponential distributions, with a linear conditional mean function
μ(·,b).
Since by Lemma 6 the monopolist and the planner have identical incentives
for market differentiation under the uniform type distribution, Corollary 2 im-
plies that competition between the two matchmakers induces a smaller (and less
efficient) degree of market differentiation. On the other hand, Lemma 5 estab-
lishes that the monopolist has an inefficiently small market coverage; by Corol-
lary 1, duopolistic matchmaking may correct this distortion. The trade-off be-
tween differentiation and coverage thus implies that the welfare comparison be-
tween duopolistic matchmakingand monopolistic matchmakingin terms of total
14. We implicitly assume that the planner is restricted to threshold participation strategies. This may
be motivated by the assumption that the planner faces the same informational constraints.Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 19
match value can go either way. The comparison generally depends on how dif-
fused the type distribution is. For the uniform type distribution, the degree of
diffusion is determined by the value of a/b, with a lower value of this ratio cor-
responding to a more diffused distribution. We have the following result.
Proposition 5. If the type distribution is uniform, then duopolistic matchmak-
ing generates a smaller total match value than monopolistic matchmaking if and
only if the diffusion of the type distribution falls below a critical value.
Proof. Under the uniform type distribution, the total match value (18) is given
by
R(c1,c2) =
1
4(b − a)

(c2 − c1)(c1 + c2)2 + (b − c2)(c2 + b)2
.
Note that the comparison between the total match value ˜ R under duopolistic
matchmakingand ˆ Rundermonopolisticmatchmakingdependsonaonlythrough
itseffectsontheequilibriumthresholds ˜ c1 and ˜ c2 versusthemonopolist’soptimal
thresholds ˆ c1 and ˆ c2.
Under the two-price monopolist, the optimal thresholds ˆ c1 and ˆ c2 can be
solved from the first order conditions with respect to c1 and c2, derived from
(7). This yields ˆ c1 = max{a,h} and ˆ c2 = (ˆ c1 + b)/2, with h = b(2
√
6 + 3)/15.
Since h > b/2, it follows that ˆ c1 and ˆ c2 are constant in a for any a/b < 1/2.T h e
total match value ˆ R is then R(ˆ c1,ˆ c2).
For duopolistic matchmaking, we distinguish three cases. In the first case,
a/b lies between
√
19−4 and 1/2. By Propositions 1 and 2, an equilibrium with
a dual market structure D12 exists. Since a necessary condition for an equilib-
rium with a lower threshold ˜ c1 > a is condition (13), which under the uniform
distribution becomes ˜ c1 < (
√
19 − 4)b, the equilibrium satisfies ˜ c1 = a.I nt h i s
case,theequilibriumhigherthreshold ˜ c2 canbecomputedexplicitlybybackward
induction: the best responseof matchmaker2 to any p1 is c2 = b/2− p1/(b−a);
the equilibrium price for matchmaker 1 is ˜ p1 = (b − 2a)(b − a)/4; and finally
˜ c2 = (b + 2a)/4. The total match value ˜ R for a/b between
√
19 − 4 and 1/2 is
then R(a,(b + 2a)/4). Comparing ˜ R with ˆ R, we find that there is a critical value
of a/b between
√
19 − 4 and 1/2 such that ˜ R < ˆ R if and only if a/b is greater
than this critical value.
In the second case, a/b is smaller than
√
19−4. Explicit formulas for ˜ c1 and
˜ c2 are not easily obtained because ˜ c1 may exceed a, but we make the following
twoobservations. First, if ˜ c1 > athen ˜ c1 and ˜ c2 arebothindependentofa.T h i si s
because, under the uniform type distribution, equations (10) and (11) imply that
matchmaker 2’s best response does not depend on a, which in turn implies that
matchmaker 1’s problem of maxp1(F(c2) − F(c1))c1μ(c1,c2) does not depend
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parametera/b. Henceforsomea/b ≤
√
19−4wehave ˜ R = R(˜ c1,˜ c2) = R(a,(b+
2a)/4), which is strictly greater than ˆ R by direct calculation. Since ˜ c1 and ˜ c2 do
not depend on a,w eh a v e ˜ R > ˆ R for all a/b such that ˜ c1 > a.
In the third case, a/b ≥ 1/2. We prove in the Appendix that there is no
equilibrium with a dual market structure (Lemma A.3). Then, there does exist
a continuum of equilibria indexed by the price charged by the first mover. In
any such equilibrium, the total match value does not exceed the value achieved
by a one-market planner that solves maxc(1 − F(c))μ2(c,b). Under the uniform
type distribution, the planner’s solution is c∗ = a. Thus, the maximum total
match value ˜ R under duopolistic matchmaking is R(a,a). It is easily verified that
ˆ R > R(a,a) for all a/b ≥ 1/2. 
It is the intermediate values of a/b that best reveal why the equilibrium out-
come is less efficient in sorting than the monopoly outcome when the type dis-
tribution is not too diffused. That is, when a/b lies between
√
19 − 4 and 1/2,i t
is efficient to serve all types (i.e. c∗
1 = a). The monopolistic coverage is ineffi-
ciently small with ˆ c1 > a even though its differentiation is efficient. In contrast,
theequilibriumoutcomehasthe efficientmarketcoveragewith ˜ c1 = abutsuffers
from inefficiently small market differentiation. When a/b is large in this range,
thelossfrominsufficientcoverageundermonopolyis smallrelativetothegainin
efficient differentiation because the optimal coverage becomes close to the effi-
cient coverage. As a result, sorting is more efficient overallundermonopolythan
under competition. The intuition is similar for extreme values of diffusion of the
type distribution. Indeed, the trade-off between coverageand differentiation dis-
appears when a/b is sufficiently high (more precisely, if a/b is greater than h,
defined in the preceding proof): the monopolistic coverage is efficient, while the
duopolistic differentiation is nonexistent because the first mover cannot survive
overtaking.
3.6. Discussion
Our results comparing duopolistic sorting and monopolistic sorting in terms of
market differentiationand market coverageare obtainedunder the assumptionof
uniform type distribution, although both the non existence of pure-strategy equi-
librium in the simultaneouspricing game (Lemma 3) and the sufficient condition
forexistenceofdual marketstructurein the sequentialpricinggame(Proposition
1) hold more generally. Among non uniform distributions of particular interest
is the exponential distribution, which has a density function exp(−(x − a)/Β)/Β
witha, Β > 0andsatisfiesAssumptions1and2. Sincethesupportofthetypedis-
tributionis unbounded,theupperboundfunctionλ isundefinedandundercutting
isnotfeasible. Asaresult,matchmaker1canalwayssurviveovertakingbycharg-
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2 to serve low types in the dual market structure D21. Indeed, we can show that
if a/Β > 2 then the equilibrium matching market structure is D21.15 Intuitively,
serving low types is lucrative when a is great and the type distribution is tightly
concentrated on these types (i.e. when Β is small). In this case, the first mover
wouldbeovertakenbythe secondmoverif it tried tocompeteforlow types. This
fact forces the first mover to serve a niche market of high types. In this kind of
equilibrium,weexpectdifferentiationtobegreaterundercompetitionthanunder
monopoly,becausethe second moverdoes not internalize the negativeimpact on
the size of the first mover’s market in increasing the lower participation thresh-
old. Since the exponential distribution has a linear conditional mean function,
our result about the efficiency of monopolistic market differentiation continues
to hold (Lemma 6). Thus, duopolistic differentiation remains less efficient than
under monopoly matchmaking.
A restriction in the present model of competing matchmaking is that each
matchmaker is allowed to use only one price and thus to create only one match-
ing market. We have made this assumptionto simplify the analysis.16 The results
comparingthe monopolist and the planner in terms of matching market coverage
and differentiation turn out to be robust with respect to the restriction to two
matching markets. In an earlier paper (Damiano and Li 2007), we consider the
problem of a monopoly matchmaker that uses a schedule of entrance fees to sort
different types of agents on the two sides of a matching market into exclusive
marketswhereinagentsrandomlyformpairwisematches. Thatpaperusesamore
general setup than our model here of monopolistic sorting, and the former acco-
modates asymmetric type distributions and an unrestricted number of matching
markets.17 By the results of Damiano and Li (2007), our Assumption 2 here is
sufficient to imply that the monopolist unconstrained in the number of matching
markets has the same incentive as the planner to perfectly sort all participating
types (i.e. one market for each participating type) and that the market coverage
forthe monopolistis at mostas largeas theefficient full coverageforthe planner.
It isalso straightforwardtoestablishthat, undertheuniformtypedistribution,for
15. This inequality is exactly the opposite of the condition in Proposition 1 for the exponential case.
If a/Β > 2 then, for any price p1 below a2, the maximum revenue for matchmaker 2 as a duopolist in
D12 is reached at the boundary between D12 and S2, leaving zero revenue for matchmaker 1. More-
over, in this parameter range, the one-price monopolist’s optimal price is ˆ p = a(a+ Β) and so match-
maker 2’s best response to p1 ∈ (a2,ˆ p) is to overtake with price p2 = ˆ p leaving zero revenue for
matchmaker 1. Finally, for prices p1 above ˆ p, the best response of matchmaker 2 is either to be a
duopolist in D21 with a price p2 < Θ−1(p1), or to overtake with a price p2 just above p1.
16. McAfee (2002) shows that most of the efficiency gains in sorting can be made with a total of
just two matching markets. He does not consider the incentives of market participants.
17. Rayo (2002) studies how a monopolist can use price discrimination to sell status goods. This
monopolist’s problem can be interpreted as a special case of the matching model of Damiano and Li
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anyfinite numberof matchingmarkets that can be offered: total market coverage
is at least as large for the planner as for the monopolist; and monopolistic market
differentiation is efficient given the total market coverage. For price competition,
it turns out that the result of inefficient sorting under competition(Corollary 2) is
robust, but the extent of sorting inefficiency depends on the number of matching
markets. In the extreme case when matchmakers can create an arbitrarily large
number of matching markets — and hence perfect sorting of all agents is pos-
sible — price competition would not lead to inefficient sorting because the type
distribution in eachmatchingmarket is degenerateandso the overtakingstrategy
completely loses its power. This is likewise the case when there is free entry for
matchmakers, even if each matchmaker can create only a single matching mar-
ket. However, as long as types are not perfectly sorted, overtaking is possible
andprice competitioninterferes with sorting. When choosingtheir pricing struc-
ture, each matchmaker fails to internalize its effect on the market share of the
competitors, and this leads to sorting inefficiency.
4. Concluding Remarks
Sorting of heterogeneous types is an essential ingredient in the literature on un-
intermediated matching markets, since the match formation decisions of partic-
ipants in a matching market depend on the distribution of types in the market
(Burdettand Coles1997; Shimer andSmith 2000; Damiano, Li, andSuen 2005).
However, as already discussed in Section 1, the existing literature on competing
intermediaries in matching markets has so far ignored the issue of sorting and
instead has focused exclusively on the size effects. More broadly, some recent
papers on directed search and competitive search markets allow for type hetero-
geneity; however, since there is no complementarity in a buyer seller or worker
firmmatchingmarket,pricesdonotplayanysortingrole(seeMontgomery1991;
Mortensen and Wright 2002; Inderst 2005). By introducing type heterogeneity
intoamodelofcompetingmatchmakers,wehavehighlightedtheroleofpricesin
coordinating participants’ market decisions and determining match qualities and
have derived important implications of price competition for sorting efficiency.
Ourresultsonthepotentialinefficienciesofpricecompetitiondonotsuggestthat
competitionis necessarilyharmfulorthat monopolyis alwaysdesirable, butthey
do mean that regulatory policies in a matching environmentshould not be exclu-
sively focused on enhancing price competition so as to expand market coverage.
Attention must also be paid to howprice competitioninteracts with the sorting of
heterogeneous agents. The gain from expanding market coverage to additional
low types may need to be weighed against the loss that results from less efficient
sorting.
When perfect sorting is not feasible, price competition interferes with theDamiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 23
sorting role of prices. How compelling is the assumption of imperfect sorting
ultimately depends on how heterogeneous we think agents are. If only a few
typesof agentscanbe profitablydistinguished,thenperfect sortingis likely to be
feasible and so the benefits of competition in terms of greater market coverage
will tend to outweigh any sorting inefficiency. In contrast, when the type space
is very rich, it is unlikely that sufficiently many matching markets can be created
to perfectly sort all agents — either because the cost of market creation is too
highor becausethe presenceof somesize effect makesthin marketsunattractive.
In this environment the benefits from sorting are large, and we may expect a
monopolist to induce a more efficient matching market structure than competing
matchmakers.
Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Assumption 1 implies that μ(t,x ) − μ(x,t) is a non decreasing function in t for
any t ∈ (x,x ) ⊂ [a,b]. To see this, first we note that
μl(t,x ) =
f(t)(μ(t,x ) −t)
F(x ) − F(t)
and μr(x,t) =
f(t)(t − μ(x,t))
F(t) − F(x)
.
Observe that μl(t,x ) converges to 1/2 as x  approachest. Further, the derivative
of μl(t,x ) with respect to x  has the same sign as (t + x )/2 − μ(t,x ),w h i c hi s
non negative if f  (·) ≤ 0. Thus μl(t,x ) ≥ 1/2 if f  (·) ≤ 0. Similarly, μr(x,t)
convergesto 1/2 as x approachest and is non decreasingin x if f  (·) ≤ 0,i m p l y -
ing that μr(x,t) ≤ 1/2. Non increasing density is therefore sufficient to imply
that μ(t,x ) − μ(x,t) is non decreasing in t as μl(t,x ) ≥ 1/2 ≥ μr(x,t).
Next we establish the sufficiency of the monotonicity condition on μ(t,x ) −
μ(x,t). Consider first the case of D12 with p1 ≥ aμ(a,b).A tp2 = Θ(p1), equa-
tions (2) are satisfied by c1 = c2 =
√
p1; under the monotonicity condition, as
p2 decreases c2 decreases while c1 increases, and thus there is no solution in c1
and c2 with c1 < c2 if p2 < Θ(p1). Similarly, at p2 = λ(p1), equations (2) are
satisfied by c2 = b andc1 such that c1μ(c1,b) = p1; under the monotonicitycon-
dition, there is no solution in c1 and c2 to equations (2) if p2 >λ (p1). Finally,
for p2 ∈ [Θ(p1),λ(p1)], the monotonicitycondition implies that there is a unique
pair of participation thresholds c1 and c2 satisfying equations (2). The cases of
p1 < a2 and p1 ∈ [a2,aμ(a,b)) can be similarly established, and a symmetric
argument holds for D21.Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 24
A.2. Kohlberg and Mertens Stability and Proof of Lemma 2
In this section we define the notion of a stable collection of matching market
structures in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and also prove Lemma
2. Fix any p1 and p2 with p1 < p2, and consider the simultaneous-move game
of agents choosing whether to participate in matching market 1 or 2, or not to
participate at all. Let γε be a perturbed game where, for each type x and each of
the three participation choices, some fraction strictly between 0 and ε of type x
agents is constrained to that choice.
Definition A.1. A collection T of matching market structures is stable if: (i)
for any Η > 0, there exists an ˆ ε>0 such that, for all ε<ˆ ε,a n yg a m eγε has a
Nash equilibriumin which at most afraction Η ofall agentsmakesaparticipation
choice that differs from the one made in some matching market structure in T;
and (ii) no strict subset of T satisfies property (i).
To prove Lemma 2, we consider only the case of p2 >λ (p1) and show that
the unique stable collection is a singleton that contains S1; the other two cases
can be similarly proved. First we demonstrate that, as ε becomes small, each
perturbed game γε has a Nash equilibrium that is arbitrarily close to S1 in terms
of participation decisions. Let mε
1 and mε
2 be the mean quality of the agents con-
strained to participating in matchingmarket 1 and 2, respectively,in γε. For each
i = 1,2,w eu s eμε
i (t,t ) to denote the conditional mean in the interval (t,t ) after
excludingthe agentsconstrainedto not participating or to participating in market
j  = i.L e tcε
1 solve (1), with με
1 in place of the conditional mean in market 1.
Consider the strategy profile in which unconstrained agents of types lower than
cε
1 do not participate while all other unconstrainedagents participate in matching
market 1. Take any sequence of games {γε}ε→0. For any such sequence and any
pair of thresholds t < t ,w eh a v et h a tμε
1(t,t ) converges to μ(t,t ). For ε small,
cε
1 is close to the solution to (1). Since mε
2 ≤ b and p2 >λ (p1), it follows from
the definition of λ(p1) that b(mε
2 − με
1(cε
1,b)) + p1 < p2 for ε sufficiently small.
Then the proposed strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of γε, and it converges
to S1 as ε converges to 0.
Next we show that, for any sufficiently small ε, there exists some game γε
that does not have a Nash equilibrium close to any other matching market struc-
ture. Consider a sequence of games {γε}ε→0 where both mε
1 and mε
2 are close to
b for all ε. (This is possible because we can make the probability of a tremble
for the highest type converge to 0 infinitely slower than for all other types.) To
rule out D12, suppose that for each γε there is a Nash equilibrium in which both
matchmakers have a strictly positive market share, and let cε
1 < cε
2 < b be the
thresholds in this equilibrium. Then cε
1 and cε
2 must solve equations (2) or equa-
tions (3), with με
1 and με
2 in place of the conditional means in the two markets.Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 25
However, p2 >λ (p1) and so, as ε becomes small, neither of systems (2) nor
(3)has a solution—a contradiction. To rule out S2, supposethere is a sequenceof
equilibria for ε approaching zero such that, in the limit, only matchmaker 2 has
a positive market share. In such sequence, the marginal participating type cε
2 in
market 2 must converge to the solution to c2μ(c2,b) = p2.A sε becomes small,
the quality of matching market 1 can be mε
1,o rμε
1(cε
1,cε
2) with cε
1 converging to
cε
2, or somewhere in between. Since p2 > Θ(p1) it follows that, for ε sufficiently
small, cε
2 will strictly prefer joining market 1 — a contradiction. Finally, to rule
outthenullmarketstructure,supposethereisasequenceofequilibriasuchthat,in
the limit, neither matchmaker has a positive market share. In any such sequence,
market 1’s quality is mε
1.S i n c emε
1 is arbitrarily close to b and since p1 < b2,f o r
ε sufficiently small the highest type agents will strictly prefer joining market 1 to
not participating — a contradiction.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 3
First, note that only a dual matching market structure with strictly positive rev-
enues for both matchmakers is a candidate for an equilibrium outcome. This is
because, for any competitor’s price, say p1, the other matchmaker can earn a
strictly positive revenue by either overtaking or undercutting.
Second, in any dual matching market structure, each matchmaker could use
theovertakingstrategytoearnarevenuestrictlygreaterthanitscompetitor. There-
fore, no dual matching market structure can be the outcome of an equilibrium in
pure strategies either. To see this point, without loss of generality suppose that
0 < p1 ≤ p2 < b2 and considerthe dual matchingmarket structure D12. The par-
ticipation thresholdsc1 and c2 are determinedby equations(2) or byequation(3)
when c1 = a,. If matchmaker 2 charges a price just above p1 (say, p1 + ε ) then,
when c1 > a, matchmaker 2 becomes a monopolist and the participation thresh-
old c  is determined as in (1). Comparing the two equations c μ(c ,b) = p1 + ε 
and c1μ(c1,c2) = p1, we conclude that c  < c1 for some ε  slightly greater than
zero. In the case of c1 = a, matchmaker 2 becomes a monopolist by charging a
price just above p1, and the participation threshold c  = a. In either case, match-
maker 2 earns a strictly greater revenue in deviation than matchmaker 1 does in
the dual matching market structure through a higher price and a larger matching
market.
Similarly, given p2,ifmatchmaker1overtakeswithapricejustabove p2 (say,
p2+ε  )thenmatchmaker1becomesamonopolistandtheparticipationthreshold
c   is determined as in (1). Since
c2μ(c2,b) = p2 + c2μ(c1,c2) − p1 > p2 + c1μ(c1,c2) − p1 ≥ p2,
for some ε   slightly greater than zero we have c   < c2. Thus, in the dual marketDamiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 26
structure, matchmaker 1 earns a strictly greater revenue in deviation than match-
maker 2.
A.4. Lemma A.1 and Proof
Lemma A.1. The revenue function of a one-price monopolist is quasi-concave
in price p.
Proof. Consider the equivalent problem of choosing a threshold c ≥ a to maxi-
mize (1 − F(c))cμ(c,b). If the optimal threshold ˆ c is interior then it satisfies the
first order condition Ρ(ˆ c)μ(ˆ c,b) − ˆ c2 = 0.S i n c eμl(c,b) ≤ 1 and Ρ (c) ≤ 0,t h e
derivative of Ρ(c)μ(c,b) − c2 is less than Ρ(c) − 2c, which is less than 0 at any
ˆ c that satisfies the first order condition. It follows that the monopolist’s revenue
functionisquasi-concaveinc. Sincetherevenueissimply pfor p < aμ(a,b)and
sincethereisaone-to-onerelation(givenby1)betweencand pfor p ≥ aμ(a,b),
the revenue function is also quasi-concave in p. 
A.5. Proof of Lemma 4
We need only show that, for any p1 ∈ [ˆ p,λ(ˆ p)], any best response of match-
maker 2 leaves zero revenue to matchmaker 1. For any such price p1, match-
maker2hasatmostfourviableoptions. (i) Matchmaker2canovertakebycharg-
ing p2 ∈ (p1,Θ(p1)]. By quasi-concavity, matchmaker 2’s maximum overtaking
revenue is (1 − F(c2))p1, with a price p2 arbitrarily close to p1 and with c2 sat-
isfying c2μ(c2,b) = p1 by (1). (ii) Matchmaker 2 can undercut by charging
p2 ∈ [0,λ−1(p1)] (when λ−1(p1) is defined). Since p1 ≤ λ(ˆ p), quasi-concavity
implies that the maximum undercutting revenue is (1 − F(c2))λ−1(p1),w h i c hi s
obtained by charging p2 = λ−1(p1) and with c2 satisfying c2μ(c2,b) = λ−1(p1)
by (1). (iii) Matchmaker 2 can allow the dual structure D12 by charging p2 ∈
[Θ(p1),λ(p1)]. However, give quasi-concavity, this option is dominated by the
option of overtaking. (iv) Matchmaker 2 can allow the dual structure D21 by
charging p2 ∈ (λ−1(p1),Θ−1(p1)).
We want to use the assumption of uniform type distribution to show that op-
tion (iv) is never optimal because it is dominated by either overtaking or under-
cutting. Observethat the maximumovertakingrevenuedecreasesin p1 while the
maximumundercuttingrevenueincreasesin p1. In addition— because,for fixed
p2 < p1,a sp1 increases c2 either decreases or does not change and c1 increases
(see equations (2) and equations (3), with the roles of the two matchmakers re-
versed) — matchmaker 2’s maximum revenue in D21 is increasing in p1.
The argument for ruling out p2 ∈ (λ−1(p1),Θ−1(p1)) relies on two claims.
The first claim is that there is a critical price ¯ p such that, for any p1 ≥ ¯ p, match-
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S2 and D21. Then the maximum revenue as a duopolist coincides with the max-
imum undercutting revenue for any p1 ≥ ¯ p, with zero revenue for matchmaker
1. The second claim is that, at p1 = ¯ p, the maximum undercutting revenue is
smaller than the maximum overtaking revenue. For any p1 < ¯ p, the maximum
revenue as a duopolist is achieved in the interior of the D21 region. However, for
fixed p2, the revenue to matchmaker 2 in D21 is increasing in p1 a n ds oi t sm a x -
imum revenue is also increasing in p1. Since the maximum overtaking revenue
is decreasing in p1, it follows from the second claim that the maximum revenue
as a duopolist for any p1 < ¯ p is smaller than the maximum overtaking revenue
at the same p1.
The derivation of ¯ p and the proof of the two claims depend on whether the
pricepair (¯ p,λ−1(¯ p))islocatedattheboundarybetweenD21 andS2 wherec2 > a
orc2 = a. We will assumec2 > a; the othercaseis similar. Considertheproblem
of choosing c2 to maximize the revenue for matchmaker 2 in D21; this revenue
is given by (F(c1) − F(c2))c2μ(c2,c1),w h e r ec1 satisfies p1 = c1(μ(c1,b) −
μ(c2,c1)) + c2μ(c2,c1). Under the uniform type distribution, the above relation
becomes p1 = (c1b + c2
2)/2 and so dc1/dc2 = −2c2/b. One can verify that
matchmaker 2’s revenue is concave in c2 and hence that the optimal c2 satisfies
the first order condition
1
2
c2
1 −

2c1
b
+
3
2

c2
2 = 0. (A.1)
Because c1 = b at the boundary between S2 and D21, there is a unique ¯ p1 =
(4/7)b2 such that (A.1) holds with equality at p2 = λ−1(¯ p1). Moreover,straight-
forward calculations reveal that, at ¯ p1 = (4/7)b2, matchmaker 2’s maximum
undercutting revenue is smaller than its maximum overtaking revenue. Thus we
have established both claims and so the lemma is proved.
A.6. Lemma A.2 and Proof
Lemma A.2. Under the uniform type distribution, matchmaker 2’s revenue
function is concave in c2 for any p1 in the D12 region.
Proof. There are three cases, depending on p1. In the first case p1 ≤ a2,w h i c h
implies c1 = a. Under uniform type distribution, the derivative of (10) with
respect to c2 is proportional to −p1 + (b − a)(b − 2c2)/2. Thus, matchmaker
2’s revenue is concave in c2. In the second case p1 ≥ aμ(a,b), which implies
that c1 is greater than a and it satisfies c1μ(c1,c2) = p1. Under uniform type
distribution, using constraint (11) and differentiating (10) twice with respect to
c2, we find that the revenue function is concave in c2 if
−

b − c1 +
c1c2
2c1 + c2

+
(b − c2)c1
2c1 + c2
< 0.Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 28
Thisisequivalentto−b(c1+c2)+2c2
1−c1c2 < 0,whichistruebecausec1 ≤ c2 ≤
b. In the third case p1 ∈ (a2,aμ(a,b)) and there is a critical value ¯ c2 satisfying
aμ(a,¯ c2) = p1 such that c1 > a for c2 < ¯ c2 and c1 = a for c2 ≥ ¯ c2. By constraint
(11), c1 decreasesin c2 to the left of ¯ c2 and is constantto the right. It then follows
from the revenue function (10) that the derivative with respect to c2 jumps down
at ¯ c2. Sincetherevenuefunctionisconcavetoeithersideofthekink,itisglobally
concave in c2. 
A.7. Proof of Lemma 5
We need only consider the case where the efficient c∗
1 for the planner is interior.
By differentiating the objective function (18) with respect to c1, we find that the
efficient thresholds c∗
1 and c∗
2 satisfy the first order condition f(c∗
1)(μ(c∗
1,c∗
2) −
2c∗
1) = 0; it then follows from (14) that Ρ(c∗
1) > c∗
1.S i n c eΡ(ˆ c1) ≤ ˆ c1 by Propo-
sition 3, the lemma follows from Assumption 2.
A.8. Proof of Lemma 6
Using the identity
(F(c2) − F(c1))μ(c1,c2) + (1 − F(c2))μ(c2,b) = (1 − F(c1))μ(c1,b), (A.2)
we can rewrite the objective function of the planner (18) as
(1 − F(c1))(μ2(c1,b) + (μ(c1,b) − μ(c1,c2))(μ(c2,b) − μ(c1,b)))
and the objective function of the monopolist (7) as
(1 − F(c1))(c1μ(c1,b) + (μ(c1,b) − μ(c1,c2))(c2 − c1)).
Observe that, for any c1, by adding a second market the monopolist can always
increase its revenue. The first order condition with respect to c2 is
μr(c1,c∗
2)
μ(c1,b) − μ(c1,c∗
2)
=
μl(c∗
2,b)
μ(c∗
2,b) − μ(c1,b)
(A.3)
for the planner’s problem and
μr(c1,ˆ c2)
μ(c1,b) − μ(c1,ˆ c2)
=
1
ˆ c2 − c1
(A.4)
for the monopolist’s problem. It follows from comparing(A.3) to (A.4) thatc∗
2 =
ˆ c2 if
μl(c2,b) =
μ(c2,b) − μ(c1,b)
c2 − c1Damiano and Li Competing Matchmaking 29
for any c2. This holds if μ(·,b) is linear, as in the uniform type distribution.
In the proof of Proposition 4 we established that, for any c1, there is a unique
ˆ c2 satisfying the first order condition (A.4). It remains to show that there is a
unique interior solution in c∗
2 to the planner’s problem. Using equation (A.2), we
can rewrite the first order condition (A.3) as
f(c∗
2)(μ(c∗
2,b) − μ(c1,c∗
2))(μ(c1,c∗
2) + μ(c∗
2,b) − 2c∗
2) = 0.
For any c1, there exists at least one c∗
2 that satisfies this first order condition be-
cause μ(c1,c1) + μ(c1,b) ≥ 2c1 and μ(c1,b) + μ(b,b) ≤ 2b.S u c hc∗
2 is unique,
too, since (by Assumption 2) we have μr(c1,c2) + μl(c2,b) ≤ 3/2 < 2 for any
c2.
A.9. Lemma A.3 and Proof
Lemma A.3. Under the uniform type distribution, there is no equilibrium with
a dual market structure when a/b ≥ 1/2.
Proof. Condition (13) is necessary for an equilibrium with D12 and a match-
maker 1 price ˜ p1 > a2. This is because, for any such ˜ p1, matchmaker 2 has the
option of charging p2 = Θ(˜ p1) to overtake matchmaker 1, which leads to c1 > a.
Under uniform distribution, (13) becomes c1 < (
√
19 −4)b; since this cannot be
satisfied when a/b ≥ 1/2, there is no equilibrium with a dual market structure in
which ˜ p1 > a2. Furthermore, condition (6) is necessary for an equilibrium with
˜ p1 ≤ a2 because, for any such ˜ p1, matchmaker 2 can overtake matchmaker 1 by
charging p2 = Θ(˜ p1), which leads to c1 = a. This condition is violated for any
˜ p1 if μ(a,b) ≤ 3a/2 or if a/b ≥ 1/2 for the uniform distribution. 
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